Anticipating a forthcoming sensory experience facilitates perception for expected stimuli but also hinders perception for less likely alternatives. Recent neuroimaging studies suggest that expectation biases arise from feature-level predictions that enhance early sensory representations and facilitate evidence accumulation for contextually probable stimuli while suppressing alternatives. Reasonably then, the extent to which prior knowledge biases subsequent sensory processing should depend on the precision of expectations at the feature level as well as the degree to which expected features match those of an observed stimulus. In the present study we investigated how these two sources of uncertainty modulated pre-and post-stimulus bias mechanisms in the drift-diffusion model during a probabilistic face/house discrimination task. We tested several plausible models of choice bias, concluding that predictive cues led to a bias in both the starting-point and rate of evidence accumulation favoring the more probable stimulus category. We further tested the hypotheses that prior bias in the starting-point was conditional on the feature-level uncertainty of category expectations and that dynamic bias in the drift-rate was modulated by the match between expected and observed stimulus features. Starting-point estimates suggested that subjects formed a constant prior bias in favor of the face category, which exhibits less feature-level variability, that was strengthened or weakened by trialwise predictive cues. Furthermore, we found that the gain on face/house evidence was increased for stimuli with less ambiguous features and that this relationship was enhanced by valid category expectations. These findings offer new evidence that bridges psychological models of decision-making with recent predictive coding theories of perception.
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Introduction
Through past experience we are able to improve our internal model of the world and, consequently, our ability to anticipate, perceive, and interact with relevant stimuli in our environment. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that the brain proactively facilitates perception by constructing feature-level models or templates of expected stimuli (Clark, 2013; Summerfield & Egner, 2009) . Neural correlates of predictive stimulus templates have been observed in visual (Jiang, Summerfield, & Egner, 2013; Kok, Failing, & de Lange, 2014; Summerfield et al., 2006; White, Mumford, & Poldrack, 2012) , auditory (Chennu et al., 2013) , somatosensory (Carlsson, Petrovic, Skare, Petersson, & Ingvar, 2000) , and olfactory (Zelano, Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011) cortex, highlighting feature prediction as a fundamental property of perception. It follows that feature-level predictions are compared with incoming sensory signals to determine a match between the expected and observed inputs. Thus, the extent to which expectations influence perception should depend, not only on the prior probability of a stimulus, but also the predictability of its content as well as the overlap in expected and observed features. For example, general expectations of encountering an animal are less informative about the forthcoming sensory experience than say, expecting to be greeted at the door by a familiar family pet. In the latter case, the set of predictable sensory features is constrained in comparison with the limited predictability afforded by anticipating any animal at all. However, it is presently unclear how feature-level uncertainty influences the underlying dynamics of perceptual expectation and decision-making.
Behaviorally, prior expectations bias the speed and accuracy of perception. When incoming sensory information is consistent with prior knowledge, stimuli are recognized more swiftly and 
